It does not appear from this correspondence that the so-called development of “Gezira” in Sudan has been stopped. What the agreement emphasizes is that the Black Country must subordinate its demands to those of Egypt. The latter country has the right to satisfy its needs from the “expropriated” waters of the Nile. It is believed that there will be a surplus that will allow Gezira Plantations Company to implement its plans. But the risk lies with them. The letters exchanged on 7 May 1929 reserved for England and Egypt “full freedom in all negotiations which might precede an agreement on Sudan and similar matters”. Egyptian statesmen can therefore reopen the Nile water issue and be able to discuss it without the sworn enemy of hunger looking them in the face. It is clear from the above excerpts that neither the British experts nor their American counterpart have said anything about “Egypt`s natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its needs for agricultural expansion.” The majority report left the whole problem to be solved over time. The minority refrained from admitting that Egypt had a legitimate right to the “unclean” waters of this river. Despite the content of these recommendations, the British government has refused to allow anything that could hinder the withdrawal of all of these 1,900,000 arable but uncultivated land.
The threat to violently defend Egypt`s right to water from the Nile has been a common theme in successive governments. Others argue that there are foreign policy concerns more important than water that relate to ideological, economic, and strategic relations with neighboring states (and with outside powers), and access to “goods” such as foreign aid and investment, oil revenues and remittances, the illegal economy, and military equipment makes the water conflict a marginal problem. [4] On Monday, March 23, 2015, the heads of state and government of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan met in the Sudanese capital Khartoum to sign an agreement to resolve various issues arising from Ethiopia`s decision to build a dam on the Blue Nile. The Khartoum Declaration, signed by the heads of state of the three countries – Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (Egypt), Omar al-Bashir (Sudan) and Halemariam Desalegn (Ethiopia) – has been described as the “Nile Agreement”, which contributes to the resolution of conflicts over the sharing of the waters of the Nile. However, this view is misleading because, as far as we know, the agreement only deals with the Blue Nile Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERDP) project and does not address the broader and still controversial issues of the division of Nile water among all riparian states. Thus, the new agreement leaves the conflict over the fair, just and reasonable allocation and use of the Nile unresolved. Sudan is less dependent on the Nile. Only 20 percent of agricultural land is irrigated by the river and its hydropower plants are significantly smaller than the GERD. The dam is likely to greatly benefit Sudan as it would stem much of the flooding that pours into its part of the Blue Nile during the rainy season. If it could negotiate an electricity supply agreement with Ethiopia, it could also increase its energy security. However, these benefits depend on a long-term water-sharing agreement, and Khartoum does not want to harm its relations with Egypt in the process.
The text of the Framework Cooperation Agreement (CCF) sets out the principles, rights and obligations for the cooperative management and development of water resources in the Nile basin. Instead of quantifying “equitable rights” or allocations of water use, the Treaty intends to establish a framework to “promote the integrated management, sustainable development and harmonious use of water resources in the river basin, as well as their conservation and protection for the benefit of present and future generations”. To this end, the treaty provides for the establishment of a permanent institutional mechanism, the Nile Basin Commission (CBRN). The Commission would serve to promote and facilitate the implementation of the CFA and to facilitate cooperation among Nile Basin States in the conservation, management and development of the Nile Basin and its waters. The 1929 and 1959 agreements both sparked resentment and demands for changes to the pact among the other Nile states, which Egypt resisted. Part V describes the dispute resolution procedures that may arise from the implementation and enforcement of the contract. It also provides for the creation of bilateral or plurilateral instruments (agreements) that would complement the CFA. The first agreement was reached between Britain as a colonial power in East Africa and Egypt. Cairo has been preferred to other riparian states as an important agricultural product. Moreover, the Egyptian-operated Suez Canal was crucial to the ambitions of the British Empire.
It will be observed that Muhammed Mahmoud Pasha speaks of “Egypt`s natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its needs for agricultural expansion”. Lord Lloyd`s reply is given to the same note. Among other things, it indicates that this convention has not yet been approved by all the countries of the Nile basin. Talks in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, in May 2009 on this new framework for the use of Nile water failed after Egypt refused to sign the agreement. Egypt argued that it would not approve a new framework that would deprive it of a right to 55.5 billion cubic meters of water per year and its right of veto over projects that would affect its allocation. This agreement was signed between Egypt and Great Britain, which at the time represented Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Sudan. The document gave Cairo the right to veto projects further upstream of the Nile that would affect its share of the water. During the colonial period, Britain effectively controlled the Nile through its military presence in Africa. Since Sudan`s independence, Sudan has negotiated with Egypt over the use of Nile water.
The 1959 agreement between Sudan and Egypt had the total average annual Nile at 18.5 and 55.5 billion cubic meters, respectively, but ignored the water rights of the other eight Nile countries. Ethiopia contributes 80 per cent to the entire Nile, but is not entitled to any of its resources under the 1959 agreement. However, the agreement between Egypt and Sudan is not binding on Ethiopia because it has never been a party to it. [13] Since the early 1990s, Ethiopia has successfully countered Egyptian and Sudanese resistance to water development projects in Ethiopia in order to increase irrigation and hydropower potential. [14] Since May 2010, Ethiopia and other upper riparian states have concluded the Nile Basin Framework Agreement for Cooperation to ensure equitable utilization among all Nile riparian countries. [15] In 1959, Egypt and an independent Sudan signed a bilateral agreement that effectively strengthened the provisions of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The 1959 agreement increased the allocation of water to Egypt and Sudan – Egypt`s water allocation increased from 48 billion cubic meters to 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan`s from 4 billion cubic meters to 18.5 billion cubic meters, leaving 10 billion cubic meters for infiltration and evaporation. Finally, the agreement provided that in the event of an increase in the average water yield, the increased yield would be shared equally between the two riparian states downstream (i.e. Egypt and Sudan).
The 1959 agreement, like the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1929, did not take into account the water needs of other riparian states, including Ethiopia, whose highlands provide more than 80% of the water that flows into the Nile. This agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which complemented the previous agreement, gave Egypt the right to 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water per year and Sudan to 18.5 billion cubic meters per year. Agriculture is the largest consumer of water in Egypt and consumes about 85% of the available water. [22] Drainage water from agricultural fields contains pollutants such as pesticide residues, toxic organic and inorganic pollutants, salts and treated and untreated domestic wastewater. To the east – delta drains – Faraskour, Serw and Hadous, water samples contained a high proportion of hookworms and other intestinal helminthic eggs. [23] In villages where the only available water comes from irrigation canals, women use the water for domestic purposes and also discharge wastewater into drains. In some areas, low water levels do not reach waterways, so farmers illegally build water wheels to bring water into the canals to irrigate their land. The lack of drainage channels and law enforcement by authorities to address these issues contribute to land and water pollution. Villagers who drink polluted water are affected by kidney and liver diseases. [24] Animal manure, dredged sediment from runoff and sludge destined for fertilizers are washed away and pollutants are a major source of pollution.
The reuse of agricultural drainage water is used legally and illegally by farmers. Inadequate irrigation and lack of education on efficient irrigation methods and agricultural production contribute to crop failures and canal pollution. In areas where there is no formal operating structure to pump water from individual diesel pumps, end users typically do not receive enough water to preserve the plants. [25] Sudan and Egypt encourage Ethiopia to resume negotiations on the reconstitution and operation of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD). An earlier round of negotiations negotiated by the United States and the World Bank failed to reach an agreement, with Egypt being the only party to initial the agreement. .