Here are eight ways to have more meaningful interactions with the people around you. Maintain eye contact. Put your phone away. Focus on what they say. Give them real reactions. Respect their views. Avoid interrupting them. Make them feel validated. Respect their time. In this book, Sartre redefines the orientation of existentialism as the individual who is understood as belonging to a particular social situation, but not completely determined by it. Because the individual always goes beyond what is given, with his own goals and projects. Sartre thus develops a “regressive-progressive method” that considers individual development as a movement of the universal expressed in historical development and of the particular expressed in individual projects.
By combining a Marxist understanding of history with the methods of existential psychoanalysis first presented in Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a method for understanding a human life. This is especially true in the case of a Flaubert analysis. However, it should be noted that the development of a representation of the comprehensibility of history is a project that Sartre addressed in the second volume of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, but which remained unfinished. After a brief summary of Sartre`s life, this article looks at the main themes that characterize Sartre`s early philosophical works. The ontology developed in Sartre`s existential magnum opus Being and Nothingness is then analyzed. Finally, an overview of the further development of existentialist themes in his later works is given. 6 Ways to Accept Others as They AreGet Your Thoughts. Think about what you`re thinking. Look for the positive. Not accepting others is the result of seeing the negative in them. Avoid good/evil dichotomies. Stop judging yourself.
Focus on the present. Reverse the situation. As we have seen above, all projects can be considered as part of the core project, and so we will focus on the motivation of the latter (Chapter 2, Part Four). The fact that one for oneself is defined by such a project stems from the fact that the for oneself is defined as a task. This, in turn, is the result of experiencing one`s own divisions introduced by reflection and temporality as a lack of self-identity. Sartre describes this as a definition of “desire to be~ (BN, 565). This desire is universal and can take one of three forms. First of all, it can aim at a direct transformation of the for oneself in oneself. Second, the for oneself can assert one`s freedom, which distinguishes it from an interior, so that it thus seeks to become its own foundation (that is, to become God).
Third, the combination of these two moments leads to the fact that the for oneself aspires to a different way of being, the for oneself. None of the goals described in these three moments are achievable. Moreover, unlike a Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad, the triad of these three moments is inherently unstable: if the für himself tries to reach one of them, he will come into conflict with the others. Since all human lives are marked by such a desire (albeit in different individualized forms), Sartre thus provided a description of the human condition, which is dominated by the irrationality of certain projects. This image is illustrated in particular in Being and Nothingness by a presentation of the projects of love, sadism and masochism and in other works by biographical accounts of the lives of Baudelaire, Flaubert and Jean Genet. With this concept of the desire to be, the motivation of the fundamental project is finally explained in relation to the metaphysical nature of one`s own. This means that the source of motivation for the basic project lies in consciousness. In particular, bad faith as a type of project is motivated in this way.
The individual choice of the basic project is an original choice (BN, 564). Therefore, an understanding of what it means to be a flaubert, for example, should include an attempt to decipher its initial choice. This hermeneutic exercise aims to reveal what makes an individual a unit. This provides existential psychoanalysis with its principle. His method involves an analysis of the subject`s entire empirical behavior in order to grasp the nature of this unit. In addition, Buber`s I-You not only deepened our respect and the value we place on each other as human beings, but also connected us to God, whom we have always set aside in our lives. Buber is clear in his statement that the I-You relationship is not only a simple human encounter, but also a divine encounter with God. As a Jew, Buber saw and understood love more than just a human emotion, but as a gift from God, whose movement always aims to build a relationship with others.
It`s not what I need or what others need, but what we both need to live our lives to the fullest. When one lives life to the fullest, one meets not only another human person, but God Himself. And when you do that, you can`t live your life authentically without God. This may also be what Husserl`s theory lacks. Buber`s I-You is not focused on individuality, but on the complementarity of each other, which are established by the I-You relationship. It is a challenge to today`s values, which are focused on “self-love”. Facebook or another social networking site gave us free access to what people look like in their “selfies,” the food they ate, the place they visited, who their friends are, what they think of a problem. These are all expressions of self-love that seek recognition. This desire for recognition of the other will soon lead to psychological dependence on what others say. Buber is aware that the focus should be on mutual relationship and not necessarily on individual needs for social recognition. In the I-you relationship, individuals spontaneously give recognition as a result of love and it is not because someone asks for it.
In the first brief discussion of desire, Sartre presents it as a search for a coincidence with itself that is not possible (BN, 87, 203). Thus, in thirst, there is a deficiency that strives to be satisfied. But the satisfaction of thirst is not the suppression of thirst, but the goal of an abundance of being, in which desire and satisfaction are united in an impossible synthesis. As Sartre points out, people cling to their desires. Simple satisfaction through the suppression of desire is, in fact, always disappointing. Another example of this structure of desire (BN, 379) is that of love. For Sartre, the lover tries to possess the loved one and thus integrate it into his being: it is the satisfaction of desire. At the same time, he desires that the loved one nevertheless remains beyond his being as the other he desires, that is, he wants to remain in the state of desire. These are incompatible aspects of desire: the essence of desire is therefore incompatible with its satisfaction. In the longer discussion on the theme of “being and having,” Sartre distinguishes three relationships to an object that can be projected into desire. It is to be, to do and to have.
Sartre argues that relations of desire to do are reducible to one of the other two types. His study of these two types can be summarized as follows. Desire, expressed in terms of being, is aimed at the self. And the desire expressed in terms of having is aimed at possession. But an object is obsessed in that it is linked to me by an inner ontological link, Sartre argues. Thanks to this connection, the object is represented as my creation. The possessed object is represented both as a part of me and as my creation. As far as this object is concerned, I am therefore considered both intrinsic and endowed with freedom. The object is therefore a symbol of the being of the subject, which it presents in a way that corresponds to the objectives of the basic project. Sartre can therefore subsume the case of having under that of the desire to be, and so we are left with only one type of desire, namely being. Levinas bases his ethics on a critique of the Western philosophical tradition that subordinates the personal relationship with a concrete person who is an existence to an impersonal relationship to an abstract “being” (Levinas, 1961/1979, p.
36). For example, when we deal with someone, we use the values and beliefs we have inherited from our society and use them as the basis of our relationship with “others.” At times, we also use them as a standard in which we judge the actions and character of “others” as good or bad. For Levinas, these social values and beliefs are abstract “concepts” that blur our gaze and prevent us from seeing, accepting and relating to “others” humanly, because we give these concepts more meaning than the “concrete person” who deserves our attention more. In our relationship with others, we also apply our own “analytical or judgmental categories” that focus more on what “I think” is good behavior, real life, correct thinking that “the other” must evoke in order to be accepted (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 46). For Levinas, however, this means transforming the other`s otherness into a “same” or like everyone else. This attitude also brings the other back to himself in such a way that if one wants to talk about the other, one is in reality only talking about oneself, that is, one`s own image (Levinas, 1991, pp. 110-111). In this case, the “otherness” of the other is radically denied. For this type of ontological approach, Levinas wants to replace a non-allergic relationship with otherness, that is, a relationship that takes into account “the infinite otherness of the other” (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 38).
What Levinas suggests is that we accept a real face-to-face encounter with “the other.” .