Corporate Integrity Agreement Database

This article contains public domain documents from the Corporate Integrity Agreements Snapshot (PDF). Retrieved 14 April 2018. A Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) is a document that describes the obligations that a company operating in the U.S. health care sector enters into with a federal agency or state government as part of a civil settlement. At the federal level, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice are usually involved, and at the state level, the Attorney General and state offices involved in Medicaid or Medicare are involved. [1] Some ICAs require an independent body to verify and monitor compliance with the conditions of the CIA. Most CCAs require claims checks to identify errors and underlying causes. [1] The government agency may verify compliance through site visits. [1] If a company breaks the agreement, the agency can impose a fine and if the problems cannot be resolved, the supplier can be blocked. [6] PKI can be used to address quality of care issues[2] or business integrity. [1] ICAs usually last 5 years. During this time, the supplier is generally required to implement or expand a comprehensive employee training program, a confidential disclosure program, written standards and policies, and to appoint a compliance officer and committee if these things have not already been done.

[5] THE CIA also requires the establishment of processes for managing and reporting “reportable events”. Reportable events include overpayments, ongoing investigations or legal proceedings, possible violations of criminal, civil or administrative laws that apply to a federal health program for which penalties or exclusions may be approved, and employment or contracting with an ineligible person. [1] THE CIA creates a framework within which the company must operate in order to avoid being excluded from participation in federal health programs. [1] States use ACEs as part of their enforcement efforts. [3] [4]:9. . . .